INTRODUCTION
Over the last twenty years, many countries have established systems to evaluate the performance of their institutions of higher learning as an incentive scheme for improving the quality of provision and as a tool for allocating government funds. The quality of the research performed at these institutions has been a particular point of focus. The manner in which academic research is assessed varies both across countries and over time. In the UK, peer review based rankings of research outputs have been complemented by impact, and the weighting of different elements of the exercise, such as the research environment or the published output sections, has changed. The system continues to evolve, with discussions of citations measures to be used in the next assessment in 2020. Systems in other countries have been reviewed in EC (2008) . These systems vary widely in how and whether they evaluate quality and how many research outputs they evaluate. In some systems, fewer than one publication per full time equivalent member of staff is submitted for review, while in others all publications are counted. In some assessments, a publication's quality surmounts the threshold if it appears in a JCR journal, whereas others have a finer ranking of output quality or rely on peer review panels to evaluate contribution.
The current diversity of approaches reflects the different purposes to which research evaluations are put and the different contexts in which research operates in different countries. At the same time, one would wish that any methodology could, as a minimum, be validated against some widely accepted evaluation criteria. This is especially pressing, as certain types of research evaluation are expensive: the most recent research assessment in the UK has been estimated as costing, by some estimates, £121 million while others put the figure including indirect costs at over £1 billion 3 .
In many cases, no such external and widely accepted criteria exist. Our basic assumption here, however, is that a department composed solely of Nobel Prize winners could be considered as an absolute standard of excellence in research, irrespective of which precise criteria are proposed. In other words, we struggle to imagine an institution which, if populated solely by those destined to win Nobel prizes, should be judged to be anything other than top quality in research. This being said, we realise that Nobel Prize winners are a very unique group and discuss other possible quality benchmarks at the end of this paper.
In view of this, we consider that a fictitious department assembled from future Nobel-winners would be a good measure of the "ideal" pursued by academic researchers so that it can be used as benchmark to gauge the reliability of the measures that policy makers apply to actual departments. We use this insight to conduct a brief investigation of research assessment exercise-style evaluation of research outputs, including not only the "top 4" system employed in the UK, but also some variants to reflect the differences 3 See Jump (2015a) . The cost is high for many reasons: the recent UK review is very complete and involves peer review that lasts over many months and involves reading and evaluating a large number of papers. It also requires submissions to be prepared by universities, which generally vet the submissions carefully. Information on the cost of other evaluation systems is sketchy.
European Commission (2010) finds that Helsinki University's direct costs of running an evaluation office to conduct their research assessment in 2005 cost 896,000 euros; the German Science Council Rating pilot study in 2005-7 cost 1.1 million euros. On the other hand, some league tables, which were included in the Commission's review, were associated with trivial expenses: the Sunday times Irish Universities League Table is characterised as a basic ranking system and has a cost estimate of only 7,000 euros per annum to build the table based on straightforward metrics. among countries in the weighting applied to number and quality of outputs. While we concentrate on Economics, our methodology is quite general and could be applied to other disciplines. This paper attempts to address three questions. Firstly, how well would an "ideal" Nobel department fare under current publication-based measures. Furthermore, we would like to know how much this performance varies across assessment cycles due to the simple randomness of publication, the size of the department, and the age profile of that department, holding the underlying population constant? Secondly, how does our Nobel department compare to some leading UK departments when some standard criteria used for research evaluation are applied? Does this help us shed light on the nature of the -not always observable -"adjustments" that actual department use in order to perform well? Finally, are there simple changes in the criteria applied that would help our Nobel department stand out compared to other high performing but non-Nobel populations and might allow for a finer ranking of actual departments at the top of the distribution, without distorting the bottom?
In addressing these questions, we restrict ourselves to a rather mechanical application of research assessment. This is for both practical and conceptual reasons. If research assessment exercises tend to involve not only area specialists but also the screening and organising activities of deans of research and other university offices interested in maximising departmental scores, then some of the softer aspects of the research evaluation exercise can be lost in the face of the more mechanical aspects of ranking and pre-screening research outputs: while peer review might generate the final rankings, the initial choice of what to include may be much more mechanically based if it is conducted by non-experts. We also have in mind that reducing the cost of research assessments by making them more mechanical and based on public information could provide significant improvement of its own, as long as these low resource approaches still provide an accurate enough signal of quality. Indeed, any ranking process will likely be imprecise to some degree. The simple methods we discuss in this paper could rank the twenty-eight departments that submitted to the past research evaluation exercise in the UK in the space of a few months using a research assistant's help and for a negligible cost. If the methods we use even get close to current rankings then this is a significant saving from a resource point of view, holding the information of the outcome relatively constant. 4 Similarly, we ignore the environment and impact aspects of the exercise, as it has been applied in the UK. Indeed, we have no objective way of evaluating what the environment in a department purely populated with Nobel Prize laureates would be: this depends on interpersonal skills as well as pure research quality and so we are unable to judge this portion of the exercise. As an aside, environment is weighted far less than research outputs in the current version of the research evaluation framework in the UK (and in other countries), so we concentrate on the main element of the evaluation -individual research outputs --only. To emphasise: our approach is deliberately simple: we are searching for a simple and low cost criterion that reveals the ranking information that is the key useful point for policy makers and publishers serving the wider public with rankings information. If this ranking information is no worse than current procedures that are far more expensive, then this is a gain. If it reveals itself as performing better by discriminating better our benchmark Nobel department, then this is an additional gain for us. 4 While we have not yet re-evaluated, using our methods, all departments ranked in the recent UK research assessment exercise, our rankings have been similar to those of the actual exercise to date. This is a focus of our current work and is important to complete the point of whether journal rankings or augmented rankings with citations information can do the work of a much more expensive procedure with little loss of (relevant) information.
Our method is to draw from the Nobel population to simulate a large number of fictitious departments, which we then evaluate using our research assessment design. We begin by rating the department according to a standard where we rate outputs produced by its members by the quality of the outlet where the research appeared. In this first exercise 4 is a perfect score, where the output of an average individual in the department is at the highest possible quality level, and 0 is the minimum score. We find in our simulations that the fictitious department's average assessment score is only moderate, at 2.88 out of 4. Hence, even our "standard of high quality" does not in any way push the top of the range of possible scores. Furthermore, the same underlying Nobel population generates a wide range of "ratings" for a department as we repeatedly draw a simulated department of laureates and assess its research, even if we draw from the same underlying population of Nobel quality individuals. In other words, our ranking would not normally be expected to show much stability across assessment periods, as the output portfolio of Nobel laureates varies across their lives and across individuals. When we constrain the fictitious department to be rather small, the variance of the rating in our research assessment system gets quite large, with the same underlying population of Nobel laureates, generating a research assessment score as low as 1.5 and as high as 4. Simulations of larger departments generate less variance, clearly, but still enough that could expect the ranking of the same department to vary significantly compared to others across research assessment cycles.
In order to raise the rating of our simulated department to various cut-off assessment scores, we find that for high scores (3.5 and 3.8) a very large proportion of faculty members would need to be dropped from the exercise in order to hit the target score. This large variance in final score and potentially large number of faculty left un-submitted simply due to random variation with no change in underlying departmental quality has implications for how one should "action" individual assessment results. If the same quality department can perform very well or very poorly due to random variance in output production, drastic action (such as a severe funding cut) due to an inference of lower underlying quality would not be justified. This section overall argues that there is room for caution in interpreting a change in relative ranking.
When we compare the performance of our fictitious department to the rankings that actual departments would achieve using our mechanical evaluation process, we find that our variants on current journalranking based output metrics fail to distinguish between our "Nobel" departments and one of the highest ranked UK departments, suggesting a lack of discriminating power at the top. This suggests that our process is missing something: it is not isolating higher quality levels well. At the same time, we note that it does seem to rank actual departments in our census period (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) in the same order as actual departments in the UK's ranking exercise in 2008, which suggests that our mechanical system might not be missing much in terms of ordinal ranking compared to the more complex and resource intensive process that is in use.
We also observe much less variance in real research assessments than in our simulations of the simpler system that we employ, which suggests several possibilities: it may be that the other elements of the actual research assessment introduce this stability. It may also suggest a variety of effects that the rankings exercises themselves may be having on targeting behaviour of both hiring institutions and those they hire. More precisely, assuming that all our laureates are of equal "Nobel" quality, and pegging this population to be stable across our simulations, we observe a large change in the ranking of our simulated departments when exactly the same individuals are "aged" one period (and replaced with a random selection of juniors from the same sample and so of the same average expected quality). This change in ranking is therefore simply due to random variations in the publications cycle. The inertia that we observe in the actual rankings raises questions about why actual departmental rankings in the UK appear to be much more stable than what rankings of our "Nobel" departments would be. Is this the result of large intrinsic differences in quality, of manipulations aimed at maintaining "reputations", of omitted elements of our review process, or of the effect of reputation on the actual REF rankings? 5 On the other hand, setting aside the Nobel sample for a moment, we obtain the same relative ranking of actual UK departments that we review and that were reviewed in the most recent UK research evaluation exercise. Hence, our ranking methodology retains the most important information that is actually used by policy makers to allocate funds and used by league tables to rank departments for wider consumption. This raises the question of whether, for all quality levels, a much simpler and more cost effective procedure would be sufficient to rank departments.
In response to the third question, we attempt other criteria for research assessment such as including more, or all, (quality weighted) publications in the research assessment period, doing a simple count of outputs and using citations to supplement journal rankings. We find that we need a rather drastic increase in the number of individual publications considered in order to obtain better separation of the Nobel Prize group from highly ranked UK departments without Nobel Prizes. In particular, moving to all quality weighted publications or including a weight on total number of publications seems to improve the relative performance of the Nobel group. We find that whether citations the ability of the ranking to discriminate depends crucially on how they are used. We do not find that using citations within the review period for papers produced during that period (what we dub "instantaneous citations") helps very much to distinguish the Nobel group from good actual departments; however, using citations to publications lagged one evaluation period does. This belies the notion that great work is only "recognised" with such delay that the true quality of research cannot be assessed in a sufficiently timely manner. These lagged citations also do a relatively good job of distinguishing between levels of quality all along the scale in the sense that they generally preserve the ranking we have from other assessment, suggesting a feasible measure and low cost that could supplement journal rankings to provide better discriminatory power. This is in keeping with earlier observations that Nobel prize quality work often is not immediately perceived to be significant. Our paper fits into a general stream of literature on research rankings. In a recent special issue on the topic of the UK Research Excellence Framework, Hudson (2013) reviews and produces a meta-ranking of journals that takes into account the audience for which the ranking is targeted, while Laband (2013) evaluates the role of citations in conducting quality evaluations. In the same issue, Sgroi and Oswald (2013) discuss how peer review panels should combine output counts with citations to generate an overall view of quality. Other literature has looked at research assessment more generally, investigating accusations of bias (Clerides et al, 2011) , and a lack of stability in rankings when the balance of quality/quantity weightings and citations systems change (Frey and Rost, 2010) 6 . We use the Hudson meta-ranking in our analysis, but we do not address citations for reasons we outline below. Our concern with lack of stability in rankings is quite different from Frey and Rost's, as we address stability over time rather than in response to a change in ranking methodology. Indeed, our rankings are relatively robust to the variants we attempt.
In contrast to these papers, our main focus is on the top quality of research output and how this is identified in rankings, although we keep in mind the implications for distinguishing the lower ranges of output as well. Top quality output has been considered specifically in a few papers. Gans and Shepherd (1994) , focussing on Nobel and Clark prize winners, comment anecdotally that even discipline-based reviewers may not easily distinguish high quality work, a point echoed by Starbuck (2005 Starbuck ( , 2006 . Abramo et al (2009) add to this the concern that selection procedures by universities of which outputs to submit to the research assessment, which may or may not be conducted primarily by experts in the field depending on who and how this selection is conducted, is the weakest stage of the evaluation process.
Our work could be thought of as making a similar point to Gans and Shepherd but where we show that a standard research assessment metric -the quality of four top papers in an assessment period --may not easily distinguish high quality work from very good work as opposed to peer review, which is their focus.
We can add a few points to this, however. We can comment on the stability of rankings predicted by our underlying population and compare these to the stability we observe in actual rankings in order to make an observation about the effects of rankings on "targeting" behaviour of universities. Even if a university's underlying quality remains the same, our simulations using our Nobel data suggest that rankings should shift a lot from one assessment period to the next due to random variation in the publishing cycle for individuals. Hence, targeting is having more of an effect than keeping the underlying quality of the population the same at an institution: it is maintaining the same quality rating within the period. In other words, an individual with a good publication "run" can move to a department that targets the quality level of this "run". This is not quite the same as hiring an individual of the same underlying quality regardless of the most recent publication "run" and may generate the greater stability that we observe. Our contribution here, other than to raise the point, is to put numbers on this effect.
We also make their observation more precise by bringing to bear citations. We can comment that Gans and Shepard's point is backed up by our citations count of papers produced within a review period and cited within the same period: our Nobel population fares not better than our high quality comparison department. On the other hand, letting citations accumulate for a single additional review period is sufficient to allow the Nobel population pull comfortably away from all the comparison departments. It is important that this difference appears relatively promptly (although not immediately): if our Nobel group needed an entire career to distinguish itself from the rest of the departments then this would be of little use to assessors interested in evaluating what a department's current output quality is. Similarly, we have steered away from H index and other similar measures reflecting career achievement in order to keep a focus on evaluating current output.
We have a more practical reason to limit ourselves to evaluating quality using journal rankings or citations only: we will be basing our analysis on a long history of Nobel Prize winner output, which spans a period during which publication and citations patterns and peer views changed markedly. This makes it difficult to perform an analysis of output as we need to quantify in some way the changes that have occurred in the profession in order to make different time periods comparable. We use a more modest process so that we can confidently adjust the data to use these earlier periods meaningfully.
The rest of his note is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our methodology. Section 3, then, examines how a "Nobel" department would rate under the type of assessment used in the UK of four top papers. The comparison between this ideal department and some of the leading UK department is performed in section 4. Section 5 presents our results on citations and how those add to our analysis. Section 6 concludes and discusses next steps.
METHODOLOGY
We begin by noting the general dimensions of recent research evaluation systems. We will aim to capture a proxy for these differences in the measures we choose to evaluate our "built" department. For this, European Commission (2010) is our main source: our characterisation of the range of current systems available is based on this report's review of various pilot systems (some of which have since been dropped or modified), systems fully in use, privately run systems, government run systems, and those conducted by individual higher education institutions. We take this as an indicator of the range of systems that have been considered seriously, even if some of these systems have since been modified. This report notes that thirty-three countries currently rank their universities in some way. The report not only summarises the main dimensions of assessment in practice but also reviews in depth twenty-one systems, covering thirteen countries in Europe and Australia and five global ranking systems.
Concentrating on the systems of research assessment, rather than overall ranking systems that include teaching and other dimensions, most systems include some form of output count over the review period. These outputs generally involve a quality and a quantity measure for publications. The number of publications included varies: there is no clear limit to the number of publications reviewed in the German Science Council system, whereas the Italian system has been quite selective in the past, including 0.5 outputs per FTE over a three year review period. The Italian system has been less selective recently, with the point here being simply that there is a range that is or has been in use in recent years. Similarly, while most systems judge the quality of the outputs, the fineness of the quality rankings differs. For example, the Norwegian system includes only two levels of quality rankings, whereas the UK an Australia have a four tier quality ranking and a five tier ranking has been discussed. Citations are often used as an indicator of quality to supplement impact factors or other measures of judging the quality of the outlet. The review window itself varies, but usually is at least three years.
Many systems include some measure of the benefits of the research for the wider society, variously styled as "impact" (UK, Australia, Belgium --ULB), "relevance" (Netherlands and Italy), or "knowledge transfer" (Germany). Measurement tends to be based on case studies or other reflective documents prepared by the institution undergoing review. Some documentary evidence of the research environment and activity also are present in most systems, including the human and monetary resources brought to bear upon research and management system employed (input measures), and the associated human outputs (such as doctorates awarded). Most involve peer review alongside metrics. Interestingly, the proposed Hungarian system allowed the individual institution to choose from a large set of metrics only a few upon which it would be evaluated.
We aim to capture some of this diversity of systems in our own evaluation of our fictitious "Nobel" department, although we cannot capture the full richness of peer review and input measures due to lack of data 7 . Instead, we focus on the output and quality portion of the assessment 8 . Happily, all systems have some form of output measurement, most often based upon publications.
To create our "Nobel" departments, we start with all recipients of a Nobel Prize in Economics since its inception in 1969 to 2013. From this set, we exclude a few outliers whose performance is known to have been affected by illness or exceptional events. This leaves us 68 individuals for whom we collect lifetime publications, date of birth (and death when relevant) as well as the date at which they entered academic work. We can then partition the career to normal retirement age of these laureates into intervals of six years each and allocate their publications to each of these periods. Perhaps because of the fairly advanced age of Nobel laureates so far, each individual in our set was professionally active for at least six periods of six years. However, most of our results will be based only on 4 "middle" periods for each individual, roughly corresponding to ages from the early 30s to about 60. Ignoring the first period makes sense since many assessment systems have special provisions for faculty members who have graduated recently. We also ignore the last period as some individuals effectively retire at some point during this period, while others go on publishing even in normal retirement. In fact, this restriction has the added advantage that it limits us to periods before the individuals received their Nobel Prize. We might expect that their publications changed markedly after this event. Our interest is not in the effect of the prize on publications but rather the output of those who merit the prize. Hence, our focus on productive periods before winning the prize is appropriate for our purposes.
We used standard indexing sources (such as JSTOR, RePec and Google Scholar) to generate a list of economics publications for each individual. We also supplemented these indexing sources with an additional search for books and other non-standard publications. We rated each publication according to the ranking of Hudson (2013) . Where this ranking was not available, we used the Keele rankings table 9 . These are on a four point scale, with 4 the maximum quality rating, although we also extend this in current work to a five point ranking to break out five Economics journals (The American Economic Review, The Review of Economic Studies, Econometrica, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Political Economy) into a separate top tier. This allows for us to experiment with a finer gradation of levels. We then aggregated these into an average score for each individual in each period, using the top one publication, the top two, the top four publications, the top five, the top eight, and also the total score over all publications, the total unweighted count of publications and the average score over all publications. The unweighted count of publications covers those publications considered to be "academic" broadly speaking, but eliminates certain publications that are more popular. This mimics systems that have fewer quality tiers.
We did not earmark publications by subfields. In this respect, we believe that relying on a population of Nobel laureates is again useful as, presumably, the distribution of individuals -or their publicationsacross fields is likely to reflect the profession's opinion of "what matters" at the time. This does not, of course, mean that field does not account for some variations in output across Nobel laureates but these variations should be seen as "incidental", i.e. as not reflecting any difference in the underlying quality of the research profiles. Indeed, field groupings are a significant dimension upon which assessment systems have differed, with field-specific research practice and requirements being the basis for these differences. We adopt a middle ground, then, of taking economics as an independent discipline but not breaking it down into finer divisions.
Given this database, we can generate "Nobel" departments of any size. We start with the number N of individuals in the department and randomly draw N cells out of the set of 4x68 "six years publication periods" that we have. It is therefore entirely possible that we will draw the same individual twice 10 . We can then compute the average research assessment rating of the N individual department. We repeat this process for 1000 repetitions to obtain a distribution of scores for department size N. We can, of course, constrain our choices to be for particular age distributions across the department as well as for different department sizes. Unless otherwise mentioned, we constrain the age distribution to be uniform over the four publication periods for all departments and generally use a department size of 48 11 . We will detail the methodology we employ for our citations counts separately in section 6 of the paper. For now we turn to the analysis of quality based on journal quality ranking only.
HOW DOES RECOGNISED EXCELLENCE FARE?

ASSESSED QUALITY AND VARIATION
Although a thousand repetitions may seem many, there are still some differences between the distributions obtained from two independent 1000 repetitions. These differences are, however, small so that a "typical" department distribution can be seen from one such exercise. Figure 1 presents such a "typical" probability density function of departmental research assessment scores when we create departments with 48 members from our Nobel population and an even distribution of ages across our "middle" four employment periods.
Department Rating
Figure 1: Probability density of departmental scores for Nobel Prize simulations
Two features are striking. Firstly, the distribution is centred on a rather low average of 2.88 12 . This means that, in the absence of the various adjustments that the actual research assessments allow for special circumstances, the type of metric used leaves plenty of "room at the top". Secondly, the variance is substantial 13 so that we should expect significant variations of assessed performance across departments even if these are all drawn from a population where every member attains the highest standard of economic research excellence by the Nobel criteria. This raises questions about the suitability of output metric measures of the type we use to actually rank departments based on numerical outcome and allocate funds based on such a ranking since departments which attain the highest possible standard of research excellence can still differ widely due to different publication patterns across both fields and individuals within these fields. 14 This variance also suggests that the relative ranking as well as the absolute rating of Nobel departments should not be very stable across successive assessments despite the fact that if we take all Nobel prize winners to be equally "good", our population's underlying quality has not changed and, given the way we run the simulations, neither has its overall age distribution or size. 15 We investigate this point and its implications in section 4, below.
ADJUSTING THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS SUBMITTED
Of course we know that actual departments do not submit all of their faculty members to research assessments. In the UK, this is a key strategic decision for departments, but other countries also allow different types of employee to be submitted on different bases. For example, the French system reviewed in European Commission (2010) requires different numbers of publications depending on whether an employee is a pure researcher ("chercheur") or a teacher and researcher ("enseignant chercheur"), while the UK system only includes those on a research contract and excludes those employed on pure "academic" contracts. The decision of whom to include can be important to a positive outcome: the UK system ties government research funding distribution to the volume of researchers submitted whereas the pure quality score, which often affects the ranking of the institution, can be increased by selecting to submit only the top researchers. In the words of one article on the recent exercise in the UK, "Is it better to be rich or well thought of?" 16 To capture selectivity, we therefore ask how many members our Nobel departments would have to drop in order to reach some specific target score. Figures 2.a. and 2.b. show the distribution of the number of faculty members that need to be dropped to achieve a target of 3.5 and 3.8 respectively. To reach the lower of these two scores, our department must shed between 1 and 23 members, i.e. between 2% and 48% with an average of about 23%. In order to secure the higher score, departments have to exclude between 21% and 71% of their faculty, with an average of about 42%. We can therefore conclude that a characteristic of large Nobel departments is that they can raise their assessment scores to levels beyond 3.5 only with quite significant cuts in the personnel submitted. This is important only to the extent that a university "actions" non-submission to a research assessment exercise. Given that our entire population is individuals who eventually won Nobel prizes for the research they conducted during the periods we include in our sample, moving any of these individuals away from a research contract would have been an "incorrect" decision in the sense of reducing the probability that Nobel-quality research would have been conducted. Our point here is only potentially cautionary, of course, since most faculty are not in this high end of the distribution of qualities. 15 The issue of the stability of relative rankings over time is addressed more precisely in the next section.
16 Jump (2015b) . 
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DEPARTMENTAL SIZE AND AGE PROFILE
We repeat the department generation experiment for different sizes of the department, i.e. N = 36, 24 or 12. There is of course no reason to expect the size of the department to affect the average performance of the department but it should affect the variance of the distribution so that one might expect the performance of smaller departments to be less stable across successive exercises. The question, then, is how much of an increase in the variance of the distribution do we see? The distributions of departmental averages for sizes of 12 and 48 are shown in Figure 3 , with the middle department sizes falling predictably between these two extremes. The shape of the density function changes quite markedly as we reduce the size of the department so that, for the same underlying quality, we should expect the ranking of small departments to fluctuate substantially more between evaluations. This might have prescriptive content for deans and others, of course, but again if we take our underlying population as uniformly of the highest quality, it does suggest that the reaction to a low rating needs to be measured: our quality does not change across cycles here but the rating can change a lot with each draw, especially for smaller departments. Hence, our simulations based on these random draws from the population suggest that one would be concerned about drastic funding cuts or other strong reactions to even relatively large swings in rating. We will have more to say about the stability of rankings in section 4, where we will look at the change in the performance of a given Nobel department which is resubmitted six years later with the same individual members. This is, of course, a tighter test for stability in the ranking of a given set of individuals as opposed to draws from a given population.
We also consider the possible impact of the age profile of the department. As explained above, we do not consider the first assessment for which a young faculty member is eligible. We can however control the distribution of faculty members over the four central six-year periods on which we rely. These averages clearly differ. In particular, the average is higher in the earlier periods, particularly the second (corresponding roughly to the early to mid-40s) and declines slightly over the career 18 .
We do not consider the sensitivity of the department's performance to variations in the fields of specialisation as there are simply not enough Nobel laureates to give us a critical mass in each relevant field. On the other hand, to make sure that our "Nobel" departments' performance is not unduly affected by variations in the professional propensity to publish from the beginning of the earliest Nobel "career" period to the present, we also computed the average from all of the "individual/career stage" observations over two distinct periods: post 1960 and pre-1960. While the first of these stages has a lower average, it also is composed of relatively few observations compared to the total data set (22% of the total). 18 This statement should be interpreted in the context of the standard deviation, of course.
Periods
19 If we restrict the data further to more recent periods, the average continues to rise but our sample gets very restricted. We chose a compromise of 1960 partly based on our own reading of the style of publishing, moving away from debate in article-responsecomment format and discussions and toward full length articles of a very modern "look".
REAL-WORLD BENCHMARK AND CHANGES IN THE EVALUATION PROCESS
There are several reasons why we cannot compare the results that we get for our Nobel departments to the ratings obtained by real departments in actual assessment processes. Firstly, as explained above, we do not consider publications at either the very beginning or at the very end of a scholar's career. Secondly, while some assessments, such as that in the UK, allow for "extenuating" circumstances that make it possible to reduce the number of papers to be submitted for a given faculty member, we do not have the required information to make similar adjustments. Thirdly, we assess the four papers per scholar based on Hudson's meta-ranking, while the peer review that characterises most systems makes at least some attempt to introduce some independent evaluation of the papers' merit. Finally, assessment includes other criteria besides the quality of publications, including "research environment" and "impact", as we have discussed above 20 .
What we are interested in is both more limited and more precise: how would actual departments compare to our Nobel departments in a system that would strictly be based on an assessment of publication quality that is well approximated by the available journal rankings? To answer this question, we collected publication data for three UK departments and one Italian department over the six-year period from 2006 to 2012 21 . The fact that these years do not correspond to an actual assessment period is intentional: we use these departments simply as comparators and do not try to understand how the scores that they received for an actual assessment exercise were generated. The three UK institutions are UCL, the University of Warwick, and the University of Sheffield mainly for convenience: it was somewhat easier to identify individuals in these universities who were associated with the economics programme than at some other institutions with more diffuse organisations. At the same time, these also represent a range of quality rankings ex post: while UCL was ranked first in the Times Higher Education aggregation of the 2014 research assessment results, the University of Warwick was ranked fifth and the University of Sheffield was ranked twenty-fourth out of a total of twenty-eight departments reviewed. Bocconi University was chosen as a prominent European university, although it clearly has not been ranked formally in the same system. We collected data only for individuals who were listed as associated with the economics department on the department's website at these institutions 22 .
The logic of this section is that, without questioning the high quality of the chosen departments, it seems reasonable to assume that a correct assessment of research quality should put them some distance behind our Nobel departments. Whether we find such a relative ranking as well as the magnitude of the distance between Nobel departments and our actual departments can therefore give us some indication of the validity of an assessment based on the quality of four publications per submitted member.
The following gives information about the number of faculty members considered in each of the actual departments, and the age structure of this group within the "middle" years. Similar information is provided for our set of Nobel Prize winners, with a draw size that is comparable to the department sizes for at least some of the comparison departments. The bottom row gives the results when we restrict attention to entries for the Nobel group post-1960. In a more prescriptive sense, we can ask whether the relative ranking of Nobel and actual departments would get closer to what we expect if the precise measure used to assess research performance were modified. In this spirit, the following table shows the average rating of UCL, Warwick, Sheffield, Bocconi and Nobel laureates if we increase the number of publication submitted from 4 to 5 and then to 8 or decrease the number to one or two. We also list the results if we report the total score for all articles receiving a positive rating during the review period, if we simply count the number of articles receiving a positive rating during the review period, or if we average the rating over all publications. Again, standard deviations are in parentheses. We find that in none of our systems does the relative ranking of the higher ranked of our comparison departments and the post 1960 Nobel department conform to the quality ordering that we have assumed. Some changes improve the position of the Nobel departments: an increase in the number of publications counted and/or some explicit weight put on the total count of qualifying publications would bring the relative ranking of the higher ranked of our departments and our post 1960 Nobel departments closer to what might be appropriate based on our assumptions about underlying research quality. Even this change, however, leaves the Nobel Prize department stubbornly low in comparison to some actual departments.
Department Number of individuals
One possibility is that our scale for ranking publications is not fine enough to distinguish the very top of the publications spectrum. In fact, the ratings scales that are currently in use vary from the very coarse to the fine. As a step in this direction, we separate out the "top 5" publications in Economics into a group rated 5 and recalculate our metrics for the test departments and the Nobel group. While the standard deviations get quite large for the departments, in terms of means only this does a somewhat better job of distinguishing the Nobel population, except in the case where an average over all outputs is taken. Finally, we turn to the issue of the persistence of rankings. As we noted above, for the same population of Nobel individuals, and when pegging the same age distribution and department size, we obtain a wide variance in realised score over our 1000 simulation repetitions. While the underlying population quality remains the same, the identities of the individuals in the 1000 departments differ. We now perform a more targeted exercise to evaluate how the ranking of the same set of individuals might compare across periods.
We shall compare the rankings of our Nobel departments to the actual rankings obtained by the UK assessment exercises, a country for which formal assessments have been carried out for a number of years already. The While the systems of marking departments changed from a rather discrete system to a more continuous system so that the rankings are not completely comparable, the ranking still looks relatively stable 24 . To get a benchmark to which this degree of stability can be compared, we also generated twenty Nobel departments, determined their ratings -and hence their ranking --and then performed the same calculations on the same twenty departments aged one period.
Clearly, some members "retire" between assessment exercises if we do this, so that we must replace the retired members with new members if we wish to maintain the same department size. If we replace the retired members with randomly selected juniors, so that the age distribution also remains the same across the original and the "aged" department, we can illustrate the change in ranking from one period to the next for our population for 20 simulated departments. This is listed in the The fact that actual departmental rankings remain much more stable over time than the ranking of our Nobel departments is quite striking. This can be explained by a number of factors. Firstly, it might be that -contrary to our Nobel departments which are drawn from the same population -the underlying differences in quality between UK departments in the top 20 is quite significant 27 . While this is certainly a factor, the closeness of the actual scores obtained suggests that this cannot be the full answer. Secondly, it is also possible that the other factors used in actual assessments, e.g. impact, are much more stable over time than publication quality so that actual rankings would show more inertia than rankings based only on the quality of publication. Still, these other factors have not received heavy weight in past exercises, so this might not be very likely. Thirdly, the rankings in the UK are produced based on peer review, not on the mechanical review process we conduct here. This difference in methodology could change the rankings. Fourthly and interestingly, previous rankings themselves might have some form of causal effects on future rankings. At least three such "endogenous" mechanisms come to mind: the additional resources coming with a higher ranking have self-reinforcing effects, it is easier to attract high quality faculty members to a department which already enjoys a high ranking, and departments (or deans) might be mostly concerned about "not losing their spot".
The degree of instability observed in the ranking of our Nobel departments should in principle foster a more relaxed attitude with respect to actual rankings since they indicate that a department can easily lose a few places, even in a world where, by definition, the department cannot possibly have done anything "wrong" between successive assessments. Indeed, our findings are meant to suggest a degree of caution in how one actions the results of research rankings: in our system, large changes can occur even if there is absolutely no change in the underlying quality of the population. As a result, such movements cannot contain quality information. Of course, it has to be recognised that real departments can change in quality even if our simulated department cannot. We do not deny that a negative result *can* represent a real fall in quality for a real department. We only wish to point out that it may not: the confidence interval is very large in our quality-controlled simulations. It is this uncertainty that should signal caution. On the other hand, the degree of stability in the ranking of actual departments might generate queries about whether they generate considerable inertia due to reputational effects or incentive effects.
CITATION ANALYSIS
The main limitation of the analysis we have conducted so far is that we have only considered assessments based on the number and quality of publications, ignoring other metrics -such as impact, grants and citation measures -which are also used (often together) in a number of countries. There are two main reasons for this choice as a first "cut". Firstly, so far at least, the type of measure that we consider has been a main element of the assessment processes conducted in many countries. The second reason is that applying our "Nobel" methodology to other metrics raises specific difficulties. The obvious problem with impact is not only that it is rather ill-defined but that going back and meaningfully assessing the impact of publications for our whole set of Nobel laureates using grants would raise similar problems and would add the element that information dating back many years is unlikely to be forthcoming. Moreover, the mode of financing of research has changed appreciably over time and differs significantly across the countries where Nobel laureates have worked.
We need, however, to address the fact that our journal rankings method has not produced a clear cut method for discriminating well across all levels of quality. Nobel prize work is often not just ordinary but extraordinary, and this feature may be difficult to detect at the time of publication or close after so that peer reviewers, referees, and even authors may not be aware of the significance of a piece of current work during a research assessment period. Allowing a measure that captures information accumulated over time as the true nature of the output becomes known has particular value with this high tier of output 28 .
Using Nobel laureates as a benchmark for some form of citation metric is more promising, although it presents the difficulty of adjusting for cohort effects. In particular, it requires some adjustment for the increase in "citations opportunities" as the size of the profession and publication outlets has increased over time. We turn now to an attempt at a citation analysis, correcting for cohort effects, discussing our methodology in some detail before turning to the results. To preview those results, we find that citations need to accumulate for more than one of our six year assessment periods to help in discriminating among quality levels, but if we do allow a single additional assessment period to elapse, they perform very well.
There are many ways to undertake a citations analysis. First, there are many sources of citations, including relatively restricted databases that list only citations within a relatively narrow scientific community and others that gather citations from a much wider set of sources including the discipline itself, other disciplines, and policy and other reports as well as purely academic publications. Google Scholar fits into this latter category and is the source we use. We chose this because we wished to go at least some way toward reflecting concerns that have been raised to include the "impact" of academic work as well as its value in generating further academic output 29 , Second, citations patterns have changed considerably over time. Card and DellaVigna (2013) trace the evolution of total citation counts in articles published from 1970 to 2012 in the "top five" economics journals, noting the large increase in median total citation counts for each. There have been other changes as well, which have generated surprising trends in citations, including a reduction in number of articles published in these top journals and an increase in their length and number of co-authors. Their figures illustrate a marked decline in citations for later stages in their period (roughly from 2002 to 2012), but these may reflect largely truncation effects in their sample.
We use Card and DellaVigna's citation counts as our measure of citation propensities for each cohort of papers, choosing the mean citation rate for each six year period as our adjustment factor for each research assessment period in our sample. In order to take a neutral approach to more recent citation trends, we assume that citation levels once truncation effects have faded will remain the same from the mid-nineties to the present. As we move farther back in time, it is clear from the type of publication we view in our sample that the economics profession has changed in how it undertakes academic debate, which affects citation practices. As a result, we take the 1966 research assessment cycle in our data as the earliest period in our analysis (so that we truncate publications at 1960). We use the same adjustment factor for publications form 1960 to 1969 as we observe in the Card and DellaVigna paper for 1970.
We also need to select which publications we count in our citation measure. This includes how many publications we track and what type. Here, we have many possible choices: we can use citations of all outputs, citations of only the top journal outputs, or the top cited papers in some limited number of publications. We have chosen to report here the analysis of citations for the top four papers in journal ranking. This tends to depress the citations of the Nobel sample since they publish very widely across quality levels and their top cited output is often not the top ranked output. While this is also true of our comparison group, the effect is greater for the Nobel group. Privileging the top five journals also allows our adjustment figures based on the Card and DellaVigna paper to be as close as possible to our own 29 Impact is a broader concept than just citations, however widely measured, as has been pointed out in King's College and Digital Science (2015) . This report analyses the impact case studies prepared for the UK's most recent research evaluation exercise and refers to the exercise's definition of impact as "any effect on, change or benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or quality of life, beyond academia". In the UK's 2014 exercise, it was measured by short case studies written up by the relevant assessment units. We wish to capture this type of impact with a measure that, admittedly, reflects only partially this broader view of impact. selection of papers: there is considerable variance in Card and DellaVigna's measures for citations across the top five journals and there is no reason to expect that other journals would necessarily perform in a similar way to these top five. 30 Finally, we need to choose a time period for tracing citations. It is of little use to a research assessment that must evaluate the current state of a unit of assessment's output to look at total citation counts over the entire history of an output: this output could be thirty or forty years old and would not therefore reflect current activity, which is the aim of many research evaluations. Hence, we do not use career measures of impact and rather look at short term measures of two types: first, we look at citation counts of outputs within the research assessment period for that period only (for example, a 1992 publication would fall within the 1990-1996 assessment period, so we would count its citations during the 1990-1996 period only). Second, we look at citations within the research assessment period during which the output was published and in the subsequent period (for the same example as above, we would count citations during the period 1990-2002, or over the current and the subsequent research period). We call the first type of citation "instantaneous" and the second "cumulative".
Clearly, we do not include any periods during or after the receipt of the Nobel Prize, as we are not interested in the effect of the Nobel Prize on citations. Rather, we wish to examine a set of individuals who would, in future, be judged of having a Nobel quality career but who had not yet received the designation.
Instantaneous citations are affected both by lags in publication for citing outputs and by when the output was created within the research assessment cycle. For example, a paper published a few months before the census date for a research evaluation would have very few instantaneous citations. This would not, however, be an accurate reflection of its quality even if there is no systematic bias in the Nobel group or the comparison departments in when publications fell in the assessment period. Allowing citations to cumulate for one further period allows both of these effects of publication timing and publication lags to fade while at the same time keeping evaluation quite close to the census date.
With this in mind, the instantaneous and cumulative citations measures for the Nobel population are shown graphically below in figures 4a and 4b. These graphs summarise the output from the same sort of exercise as we conducted with journal rankings: this time, we form a department of 36 members, drawn from our Nobel population and with equal distribution across the four "midcareer" age groups, and count up their citations for their top four publications. We then repeat this exercise 1000 times and graph the results as departmental averages for each draw.
30 Despite this, we use a common cohort factor for all our publications. We chose the American Economic Review (AER) citation figures as our cohort effect, as the pattern of AER papers falls in the middle of the pattern of citation counts in the top five journals. Using slower growth citation patterns, such as that of Econometrica does not negate our point. In this case, the mean instantaneous citation figure of the Nobel "department" falls below that of our highly ranked department if this is used, while our cumulative citation figure remains comfortably above, making our point stronger that instantaneous citations do not particularly add to the discriminatory power of the assessment but a one period cumulation does. On average, we obtain fifty-seven citations for these top four papers within the period, but this rises to 266 when we cumulate over the period of publication and the next research assessment period. As before, increasing the department size lowers the standard deviation of the exercise and decreasing the size raises it. When we change the age distribution, we find the highest average cumulative citation rates for young departments. This steadily falls as the department ages from an average of 61 (instantaneous) and 293 (cumulative) to an average of 55 (instantaneous) and 217 (cumulative) as one moves from the youngest period of midcareer (age 36-41) to the oldest period (age 54-59) 31 .
Comparing this to our real departments, we perform the same exercise of selecting the top four outputs for each member and counting the instantaneous and cumulative citations. Since we have chosen the period 2007-2012 for these departments, we cannot cumulate in the same way as the Nobel sample (since six years have no elapsed since 2012). Instead, for the same departmental members, we look back at their publication record in the previous six year period, and cumulate the citations to those papers. Hence, we obtain a two period record up to 2012 for these people. We list in table 8 both the "instantaneous" citations for the earlier period and for papers produced in the most recent period in order to illustrate the variance we get across time when using this method. We eliminate from the department anyone who was too young (or had not yet started their academic career) in the previous period to have a full submission. This reduces our number of members in each department in our census as we limit ourselves to observing those who are currently departmental members.
For this comparison group, the equivalent instantaneous citations in the two periods and cumulative citations for the first of the two periods are listed in The citations measure maintains the ranking of UK departments that we obtained with outlet rankings. Bocconi fares considerably better, now appearing on a par with UCL on the instantaneous ranking (once above, once below) and higher on the cumulative ranking. This cumulative ranking could easily reverse if we could repeat this exercise for the 2007-2012 outputs since UCL is ahead on instantaneous citations for these papers, but the point is that the citations change the ranking modestly compared to the outlet ranking for these two institutions.
Other citations measures can be considered. As we mentioned, choosing the most highly cited outputs, rather than restricting ourselves to the citations of the highest ranking outputs by "outlet" tends to increase the difference between the Nobel and the comparison population. We could also choose a different number of base outputs upon which to rank the Nobel group versus the others. Importantly, however, if one wishes to minimise the resources that are put into the evaluation exercise, it is not necessary to select more than four outputs in order to make the distinction between our Nobel group and others.
We also note as an aside that the ranking based on outlet rankings is preserved up to a point by the addition of citations. We note, however, that Bocconi and UCL switch places depending on whether one looks at instantaneous or cumulative citations. Still, it is significant that both the top and the lower ranges of the quality distribution seem to be picked out by the citations ranking so that we do not lose information on the ranking compared to the methods undertaken by the current UK research evaluation exercise, however expensive and informed by peer review, with this low cost and mechanical ranking.
.
CONCLUSION
Research assessment exercises, and the incentives they create for researchers, can have a profound effect on the way they spend their time and how they choose to express their ideas. For this reason, it is important to get the design of research assessment right. Exactly what that entails depends on the aims of the system, which differ across countries and have differed across time. We take a particular view of these exercises, suggesting that one aim is to get high quality research publications as output. How to measure that quality is the specific subject of our paper: if researchers are to direct their work in response to the research assessments, and if high quality publications are a goal, we would want quality to be measured accurately so that effort is not wasted in generating outputs that do well by a faulty metric.
A difficulty is to find a set of outputs that we are willing to take as high quality and then test the system we develop to see if this set is identified as high quality by the metric we develop. We have used simulations based on a dataset composed purely of Nobel Prize winners, as our standard of high quality, to make a series of points about research assessment, using a mechanistic approach of evaluating research output using journal rankings. As a comparison, we subject some actual departments to the same evaluation procedure we use for the Nobel population. Based on our results, we can make several observations. First, taking the Nobel population as the desiderata of high quality, we note that the Nobel population does not stand out compared to other top departments if we use the average ranking of the top four publications in each of our 6 year evaluation periods, suggesting that the mechanistic view of the review process that we adopt does not distinguish the top of the quality distribution terribly well. If other papers had indicated greater confidence in qualitative evaluation by peer panels, we would not be concerned with our finding. Unfortunately, we do not have good evidence that peer review panels tend to improve the accuracy of the mechanistic portion of research evaluation exercises.
On the other hand, we find evidence that citations can be used to discriminate better among quality groups, finding that citations that have cumulated over two review periods allow the Nobel group to separate itself out from the other comparison departments. This is not the case for citations that accumulate immediately: here, the Nobel department looks similar to any other very good department.
Second, we note that the same underlying population generates a wide set of rankings in our simulations due to variance across the careers of the individuals in our data set. This variance in average ranking increases as the size of the department falls, with a support ranging from a low of about 1.5 to 4 for a 12 member department to 2.2 to 3.4 for a larger department. When we conduct a more specific experiment of "aging" a department of constant size, we find that the rankings of those aged departments change and change more than the rankings we have observed in the last few actual research assessment exercises in the UK, as one comparator where several research assessments have been conducted on a large scale. This suggests a significant impact of "targeting" a ranking by actual departments. Indeed, this is perhaps the finding that we find most intriguing: that the rankings generate inertia in themselves as universities target specific positions in the ranking and attract staff with particular qualities of publication "runs", and who also target rankings of their employers. This generates a pattern of hiring behaviour in the pre-assessment period that we casually observe. At the same time, competition using rankings is particularly intense in the UK at the moment compared to other countries due to the changing organisation of the sector. This targeting effect may, then, be particular strong in the UK.
Third, we note that other measures of output quality and quantity, such as including more publications or taking the total of all publications in the period, only seem to improve on taking the top four publications if the scope of the metric is extended drastically. Of course, as significantly increasing the number of publications considered might also remove a number of taxing administrative measures involved with selecting publications, such an expansion of the metric might be worth considering. We do not investigate citations, due to the difficulty in comparing citations propensity across time for our Nobel group. This dimension has been treated elsewhere, however, as we mentioned in the introduction, and is one focus of our current work.
In sum, the "top four" metric of research assessment does not seem to distinguish the top of the profession very well, using the Nobel Prize as an accurate measure of "the top". An increase in the number of publications considered per individual could improve matters. We also show that even departments composed of only the best possible researchers would show significant "natural" variation over time, suggesting that targeting behaviour is affecting the rankings significantly.
Clearly, there are many other exercises we could conduct to probe the design of research evaluation systems more completely. In particular, the rankings of books compared to journal articles could be investigated: in citations measures, books do very well. This might suggest that they should be given more prominence when investigation the contribution of research output. Second, the sensitivity of the results to the source of citations and rankings could be probed: while some (notably Griffith, Kocherlakota and Nevo (2009) have noted that citations on Google Scholar, ISI Web of Knowledge and Citations in Economics are highly correlated in their sample) have suggested that the source might not matter a great deal, this could be investigated. Nobel Prize candidates are also not necessarily the only group to use as a "desiderata". One could, for example, use real departments that have performed well in the past, such as Harvard or MIT as standards of quality. These robustness checks are the subject of current research; however, the reader should keep in mind that to date our robustness checks have not modified the conclusions we have drawn.
